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Field of Visions
INTERORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE
SMART ENERGY TRANSITION IN WASHINGTON
STATE
Scott Frickel,† Daniela Wühr,†† Christine Horne* &
Meghan Elizabeth Kallman**
INTRODUCTION
Now more than a century old, the United States’ power
grid is a good candidate for an overhaul. America’s electrical
system was designed to meet the needs of a smaller population
that was confronting the economic, political, and technological
opportunities and challenges of an earlier era.1 Today, that
same grid is outdated and overused. It operates at the limits of
demand capacity under certain conditions;2 it is increasingly
vulnerable to system disturbances and ill-equipped to meet the
rapidly changing needs of an ecologically stressed society and
planet.3 In this context, many see the smart grid as a promising
approach for building a more efficient, responsive, and
sustainable energy system for the twenty-first and twentyBrown University.
University of Augsburg.
* Washington State University.
** Brown University.
1 See RICHARD MUNSON, FROM EDISON TO ENRON: THE BUSINESS OF POWER
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY 4 (2005).
2 Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29, 29, 34 (2012).
3 See generally CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2014) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE
2014—MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE] (This report is a relatively comprehensive
assessment of options for mitigating climate change through limiting or preventing
greenhouse gas emissions as well as activities that reduce their concentrations in the
Earth’s atmosphere.); Lauren Reilly, Automatic Consumer Privacy Rights Embedded in
Smart Grid Technology Standards by the Federal Government, 36 VT. L. REV. 471 (2011)
(This article covers some of the principal privacy concerns related to the Smart Grid, and
encourages an institutional focus on privacy measures.); Joskow, supra note 2 (This
article covers many facets of modernizing and expanding transmission and distribution of
energy, including demand-response and stimulating investment.).
†

††
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second centuries.4 While “smart grid” is an amorphous concept, it
generally means “a modernized grid that enables bidirectional
flows of energy and uses two-way communication and control
capabilities” to allow for new ways of configuring energy systems,
functions, and applications.5
Smart meters are one key component of the smart grid.
Variable in design, smart meters (also called Advanced
Metering Infrastructure or AMI) are embedded elements of a
larger sociotechnical system.6 They transmit information about
consumer electricity use to utility companies at much smaller
time intervals than traditional systems—minute-to-minute rather
than month-to-month—which allows utilities to remotely
coordinate power supply and demand, detect outages, implement
time-of-use and dynamic pricing, and improve system efficiency
and reliability in other ways.7 With appropriate technological
interfaces, smart meters also integrate electricity users into the
smart grid by allowing them to closely monitor, fine-tune, and
reduce energy consumption and consumer costs.8
Positive expectations for the smart grid and smart
meters tend to run high among policymakers, regulators,
engineering and computer science professionals, industrialists,
environmentalists, and others.9 To be sure, this potential is both
exciting and daunting. It is exciting because the smart grid
appears to offer potential solutions to many different kinds of
problems; it is daunting because different organizations and
stakeholders define and understand the smart grid in different
ways.10 It is these differences of “technological vision”11 and
4 JENNIE C. STEPHENS ET AL., SMART GRID (R)EVOLUTION: ELECTRIC POWER
STRUGGLES 5 (2015).
5 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SMART GRID: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE 3,
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/smartgrid/SmartGrid_guide.pdf [https://
perma.cc/28B7-RX2V].
6 For a general discussion of sociotechnical systems, see Thomas P. Hughes,
The Evolution of Large Technological Systems, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 1989).
7 See Elias Leake Quinn, Privacy and the New Energy Infrastructure 8, 11–
12 (Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Sec., Working Paper No. 09-001, 2008).
8 Jing Liu et al., Cyber Security and Privacy Issues in Smart Grids, 14 IEEE
COMM. SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 981, 981 (2012), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.462.4054&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/AW8X-4LA7].
9 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN FOR A 21ST
CENTURY ELECTRIC GRID; About, SMARTGRID CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, http://smart
gridcc.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/X9MY-Y9TV]; EDISON ELEC. INST., www.eei.org
[https://perma.cc/43VS-4PJ4]; see generally PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE
CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2010).
10 GILBERT N. SOREBO & MICHAEL C. ECHOLS, SMART GRID SECURITY: AN
END-TO-END VIEW OF SECURITY IN THE NEW ELECTRICAL GRID, at xix (2012).
11 Meinolf Dierkes et al., Technological Visions, Technological Development,
and Organizational Learning, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING &
KNOWLEDGE 282 (Meinolf Dierkes et al. eds., 2001).
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their implications for sociological theory and energy policy that
is our focus in this paper.
Part of a larger ongoing study on the diffusion of smart
meters in Washington State, the present analysis uses
organizational theory to investigate similarities and differences
between key actors in Washington’s emerging smart meter field.
“Fields” are interactive domains “in which [organizations with]
competing interests negotiate over issue interpretation”12 and
make decisions based on relationships with other field actors.13
The smart meter field involves a wide range of organizational
actors including electrical utilities, regulatory agencies,
municipalities, power plants, technology firms, universities,
national laboratories, and trade associations, among others.14
Because these actors occupy distinct positions in the field, smart
meters and related technologies may mean different things to
different actors—a financial investment, a democratization
project, a bid for energy independence, progress towards a cleaner
energy future, or something else entirely. Such different visions
can coexist within a field and influence one another in various
ways, but any specific technology necessarily imposes systemwide changes,15 and our intention is to be sensitive to such
changes. Some visions may be complementary and facilitate
communication, while others may create problems of
communication and give rise to conflict. Because visions can help
to coordinate actions within and across organizations, we see the
task of identifying the technological visions of relevant actors—and
assessing the extent to which they are mutual, complementary, or
conflicting—as an important first step in developing a deeper
sociological understanding of the role that smart meters will play
in the transition to a smart energy system.
The following analysis develops in five parts. Part I
begins by situating Washington’s smart meter field within a
broader historical and national context. Part II presents a
theoretical framework that integrates Dierkes et al.’s concept
12 Andrew J. Hoffman, Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism
and the U.S. Chemical Industry, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 351, 351 (1999).
13 PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 17–18 (Ernest
Gellner et al. eds., Richard Nice trans., 1977).
14 PHILLIP LAPLANTE, STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS FOR SMART GRID SYSTEMS 3
(2010), http://paris.utdallas.edu/IEEE-RS-ATR/document/2010/2-Stakeholder%20Analysis%
20for%20Smart%20Grid%20Systems_Laplante%20RAMS.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGW7-HU
J9]; LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 10, 29 (2008), http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages%28
1%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/37NG-C487].
15 See generally Jennie C. Stephens et al., Socio-Political Evaluation of Energy
Deployment (SPEED): A Framework Applied to Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1930 (2014).
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of technological vision16 with Fligstein and McAdam’s field
theory.17 Part III briefly describes our methods and data, which
derive from interviews conducted in 2015 with individuals
representing different smart meter field organizations. We
then present the results of our analysis in Part IV. Finally, this
article concludes with a summary of our findings and a
discussion of their implications for future research and policy.
I.

SMART METERS: HISTORICAL AND NATIONAL CONTEXT

In 2003, cascading power outages across several
midwestern and northeastern states and Ontario, Canada left
50 million people without power for days.18 The blackout’s
proximate cause was that utility companies lacked timely
information about the initial outage, and were thus unable to
effectively reroute electricity flow that would have prevented
working power lines from overloading.19 By some estimates, the
blackout caused $7–$10 billion in economic damages,20 exposing
the increasingly severe limitations of the U.S. energy grid. In
response, Congress passed the Energy Infrastructure and
Security Act of 2007 (EISA).21 Intended to move the United
States towards greater energy independence and security, Title
XIII of EISA focused specifically on the smart grid, calling for a
range of technological improvements as well as creating a
Smart Grid Task Force.22 This legislation set in motion the rise
of a new and rapidly changing organizational field focused on
the sociotechnical development of smart grid systems with
smart meter technologies at its core.
Since 2009, funding for smart grid-related research and
development (R&D) from public and private sources has totaled

Dierkes et al., supra note 11, at 282–98.
See generally NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS (2012).
18 U.S.-CAN. POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE
AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2004), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/Documentsand
Media/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV5Z-WV5W].
19 Id. at 30.
20 ELEC. CONSUMERS RES. COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE AUGUST
2003 BLACKOUT
1
(2004),
http://www.elcon.org/Documents/Profiles%20and%20
Publications/Economic%20Impacts%20of%20August%202003%20Blackout.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/3GKY-XB9Q].
21 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (2007); Alison C. Graab, Note, The Smart Grid: A Smart Solution to a
Complicated Problem, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2051, 2052–53 (2011).
22 Graab, supra note 21, at 2054–55, 2059.
16

17
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more than $12.5 billion,23 including $4.5 billion allocated
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA).24 This federal funding stream has been channeled, in
part, into new programs aimed at developing smart meters and
other “smart” energy-related systems and components. These
programs have been conducted by electrical utilities, universities,
federal research facilities, and large and small engineering and
technology firms across the country.25 Professional communities of
engineers, technicians, and computer scientists have embraced
the challenge of smart energy systems with a raft of new
conferences, journals, newsletters, websites, and other fora
devoted to the smart grid.26 The same is true of many states,
counties, and municipalities, who have partnered with researchers
on dozens of federally funded smart grid-related projects on themes
ranging from technology development and software applications to
consumer behavior and worker training.27 This organizational
activity, along with mounting environmental and economic
concerns regarding climate change and slowing global trade,28 is
helping to fuel the growth of knowledge production and
technological innovation, as measured by patent applications,
published articles, and research grants.29 Figure 1, below,
illustrates the surge in growth that has occurred in the early
twenty-first century.

23 Recovery Act: Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act-smart-grid-investment-grant-s
gig-program [https://perma.cc/35JK-SHRG].
24 Joskow, supra note 2, at 31.
25 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GUIDEBOOK FOR ARRA SMART GRID
PROGRAM METRICS AND BENEFITS (2009), https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/Guidebook_
for_ARRA_Smart_Grid_Program_Metrics_Benefits_200912.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK6
L-CZYP] [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK FOR ARRA SMART GRID PROGRAM].
26 As one example, see Organizational Purpose, SGIP, http://www.sgip.org/
about-us/organization-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/MNQ8-7RDA].
27 See generally Recovery Act: Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) Program,
supra note 23.
28 See generally Austin H. Becker et al., A Note on Climate Change
Adaptation for Seaports: A Challenge for Global Ports, a Challenge for Global Society,
120 CLIMATE CHANGE 683 (2013) (discussing how environmental concerns affect trade
and ports specifically); Antoine Dechezleprêtre et al., What Drives the International
Transfer of Climate Change Mitigation Technologies? Empirical Evidence from Patent
Data, 54 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2013) (using theories of diffusion to analyze
the effects of patent law on global trade and exchanges of ideas); Richard S.J. Tol,
Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change: Part II. Dynamic Estimates, 21
ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 135 (2002) (estimating some effects of environmental
degradation, including climate change specifically).
29 HELEEN DE CONINCK ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY-ORIENTED AGREEMENTS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 1–3 (2007); Frank
W. Geels, From Sectoral Systems of Innovation to Socio-Technical Systems: Insights
About Dynamics and Change from Sociology and Institutional Theory, 33 RES. POL’Y
897, 897–98 (2004).
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FIGURE 1. Smart Grid- and Smart Meter-Related Patent
Applications, Published Articles & Research Grants, 1986–201330

Legal and regulatory changes are additional indicators
of this burgeoning field’s broad social and economic significance
and its organizational heterogeneity. By 2011, all 50 states had
enacted a combined 247 changes to their legal codes and
regulatory frameworks in ways intended to facilitate smart grid
expansion.31 (21 states had also passed legislation granting
specific legal authority to install smart metering devices in homes
and offices.)32 These legal changes, as well as those enacted by
states since 2011 and by a growing number of municipalities,33
have added momentum for the rollout of advanced metering
devices. By 2015 there were approximately 64.7 million
30 WEB OF SCI. DATABASE (2014), http://www.webofknowledge.com (last
visited Apr. 4, 2017) (search for “smart meter*” in active and expired awards); Patent
Application Full Text and Image Database, US PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://appft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (search for “smart meter” and
search for years “1986–2013”) (data current through Mar. 30, 2017); Awards Simple
Search, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2017)
(search for “smart grid”, “smart meter”, and “advanced meter”).
31 For example, states have passed laws addressing privacy issues associated
with smart meters, providing for “opt-out” choices, encouraging net metering, and
updating energy efficiency goals. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SMART GRID
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY POLICIES AND CASE STUDIES (2011), http://www.eia.gov/
analysis/studies/electricity/ [https://perma.cc/2WC7-2MZ7].
32 States Providing for Smart Metering, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/states-providing-for-smart-metering.
aspx [https://perma.cc/7BKM-ZXZV].
33 See generally David J. Hess, Electricity Transformed: Neoliberalism and
Local Energy in the United States, 43 ANTIPODE 1056, 1063–64 (2011) (Hess’s framework
permits dynamic interpretation of the history of the U.S. electricity industry, that is
sensitive to the various roles of state intervention, legislative and regulatory scale shifts,
and the extent to which policies favor elite accumulation or redistribution.).
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advanced metering devices installed, including in U.S. homes
and commercial buildings.34
Yet despite clear evidence of the field’s rapid emergence
and growing recognition of the central role that the smart grid
must play in society’s transition to a more sustainable renewable
energy system, smart grid development and implementation
across the United States has been highly uneven and fraught
with unanticipated challenges.35 Nationally, smart meter
implementation strategies and regulatory frameworks lag behind
most European Union (EU) member countries.36 For instance, the
landscape of installed smart meters in the EU shows a centralized
approach where a legal framework is complemented by a clear
implementation structure.37
Smart meter implementation varies considerably between
the states as well, where its development has been characterized
by varying degrees of support (e.g. Texas), resistance (e.g.
California), and indifference (e.g. Tennessee).38 This variation is
also mirrored within individual states, such as Washington,
where different smart meter implementation projects have been
“completed successfully or are in progress with no significant
delays or difficulties,” while others have not been completed or
have stalled out.39 In 2015, smart meters were installed in over
1.6 million residences and industrial and commercial buildings
in Washington State.40 This share, while small, reflects the sum
efforts of a heavily populated and heterogeneous smart meter
field composed of at least 261 individual and organizational
34 Frequently Asked Questions: How Many Smart Meters Are Installed in the
United States, and Who Has Them?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, http://www.eia.gov/tools/
faqs/faq.cfm?id=108&t=3 [https://perma.cc/SCV6-WTJY] (last updated Dec. 7, 2016).
35 Seth Blumsack & Alisha Fernandez, Ready Or Not, Here Comes the Smart
Grid!, 37 ENERGY 61 (2012); see GLOBAL SMART GRID FED’N, GLOBAL SMART GRID
FEDERATION REPORT 8–11 (2012), https://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/files/doc/files/
Global_Smart_Grid_Federation_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQS5-PQE4]; see generally
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014—MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3; Ann Cavoukian
et al., SmartPrivacy for the Smart Grid: Embedding Privacy into the Design of Electricity
Conservation, 3 IDENTITY INF. SOC’Y 275, 275 (2010); Joskow, supra note 2.
36 GLOBAL SMART GRID FED’N, supra note 35, at 21; see generally SMART
REGIONS, EUROPEAN SMART METERING LANDSCAPE REPORT 2012—UPDATE MAY 2013
(2013) [hereinafter EUROPEAN SMART METERING LANDSCAPE REPORT] (This report
provides an overview of the state of smart metering in European nations. Based on this
data, U.S. installation lags.).
37 This has resulted in twelve member states enacting a mandatory full smart
meter roll-out. EUROPEAN SMART METERING LANDSCAPE REPORT, supra note 36, at 3–7.
38 GLOBAL SMART GRID FED’N, supra note 35; see generally GUIDEBOOK FOR
ARRA SMART GRID PROGRAM, supra note 25.
39 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 31, at 1.
40 Electric Data Sales, Revenue, and Energy Efficiency Form EIA-861
Detailed Data Files, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/
electricity/data/eia861 (follow 2015 “ZIP” hyperlink; then select “Advanced_Meters_2015”
Excel spreadsheet).
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actors (see Table 1). Some organizations are large and
economically powerful, but most are smaller and claim
relatively modest resources.41 As data presented in Table 1
shows, field actors are broadly distributed across the state,
although most organizations concentrate in the heavily
urbanized areas west of the Cascade Mountain Range, a few
organizations are located outside of Washington altogether.
TABLE 1. Individual and Collective Actors in Washington’s
Smart Meter Field42
Geographic Location
Actor Type

Count

Washington

Other States

Power Generators

122

122

0

Power Distributors

68

65

3

Tech. Companies

27

27

0

Academic R&D

6

5

1

Government
Agencies

6

4

2

WA Legislators

12

12

0

8

2

7

3

1

2

Patent Applicants

5

5

0

Anti-Smart Grid
Orgs.

1

1

?

Other

3

3

0

261

247

14

Prof./Trade
Associations
Extra-Gov’t
Committees

TOTAL

41 Utility companies range in size, serving anywhere from 30,000 to over a
million customers. See, e.g., About Your PUD, LEWIS COUNTY PUD, http://lcpud.org/
pud/about [https://perma.cc/PXX9-F379]; Puget Sound Energy Service Area, PUGET
SOUND ENERGY, https://pse.com/aboutpse/PseNewsroom/MediaKit/1213_ServiceArea
Map_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4BR-RGJW].
42 Participating
Members, SGIP, http://www.sgip.org/membership-benefits/
members/ [https://perma.cc/A9DS-XAJM]; Washington, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=WA [https://perma.cc/YSB7-CMBB]; Patent Application
Full Text and Image Database, supra note 30 (search “smart grid,” “smart meter*,” and
“advanced meter*”).
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The high level of organizational heterogeneity reflected
in Table 1 hints at the potential challenges involved in
implementing smart meters in cities and towns across
Washington State (and elsewhere). Each set of actors will likely
have an individualized understanding of smart meter
applications and how they relate to existing energy markets
and the larger energy system. Sometimes these visions may be
consistent with those of other actors; sometimes their visions
will diverge. Thus, the actions that organizations pursue based
on their unique visions may facilitate broader implementation
of smart meter applications, but they may also interfere. And
because organizations in the smart meter field operate in
relation to one another, actors’ different visions are likely to
shape how others make decisions and reorient goals. The next
section develops a theoretical framework for more
systematically investigating this broader “field of visions.”
II.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To date, most existing research on the smart grid and
smart meters has taken a relatively narrow view of
organizational challenges. Researchers have identified specific
mechanisms that encourage implementation, such as legal
changes,43 market pricing,44 or consumer information campaigns.45
Other studies identify specific barriers to implementation, such as
higher energy bills,46 legal challenges to privacy statutes,47 social
norms related to emerging technologies,48 or the mobilization of

43 Patrick McDaniel & Stephen McLaughlin, Security and Privacy Challenges
in the Smart Grid, 7 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 72, 75 (2009); Eoghan McKenna et al.,
Smart Meter Data: Balancing Consumer Privacy Concerns with Legitimate
Applications, 41 ENERGY POL’Y 807 (2012).
44 Daniel Breslau, Designing a Market-Like Entity: Economics in the Politics
of Market Formation, 43 SOC. STUD. SCI. 1 (2013).
45 See
generally Sarah Darby, Smart Metering: What Potential for
Householder Engagement?, 38 BUILDING RES. & INFO. 442, 446 (2010); Magali A.
Delmas & Neil Lessem, Saving Power to Conserve Your Reputation? The Effectiveness
of Private Versus Public Information, 67 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 353 (2013) (This
article tests the efficacy of detailed private and public information on electricity
consumption and conservation.).
46 See Quinn, supra note 7; Cavoukian et al., supra note 35; Felicity Barringer,
New Electricity Meters Stir Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/31/science/earth/31meters.html [https://perma.cc/EF6M-2LUX].
47 Kevin L. Doran, Privacy and Smart Grid: When Progress and Privacy
Collide, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 909 (2010); see Alfredo Rial & George Danezis, PrivacyPreserving Smart Metering, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH ANNUAL ACM WORKSHOP ON
PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC SOCIETY 49 (2011).
48 Christine Horne et al., Privacy, Technology, and Norms: The Case of Smart
Meters, 51 SOC. SCI. RES. 64, 64 (2015).
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public health concerns.49 Overall, however, extant studies do
not offer a framework for understanding how and why the
various opportunities and constraints to implementation
operate in relation to one another.
Institutional theory, a branch of organizational theory,
“directs attention toward forces that lie beyond the
organizational boundary, in the realm of social processes.”50 For
institutional theorists, organizational decisions are not seen as
a rational choice within an endless array of possibilities, but
rather as decisions made within a narrow set of options that are,
in turn, determined by a group of actors operating within the
organizational field.51 Institutional theory offers a deeply
sociological perspective, emphasizing the role of social structure,
pressures for legitimacy, and norms in organizational decision
making. In other words, institutional arguments are
“constructionist in the sense that they view the creation of
institutions as an outcome of social interaction between actors
confronting one another in fields or arenas.”52 This type of
analysis seeks to explain social outcomes by looking at the
interaction of many actors within a field.
A.

Organizational Fields

Little used in legal scholarship, field theory53 provides a
useful framework for understanding and explaining mesolevel54 collective outcomes. As a theoretical framework, it
analyzes the perspectives, interests, and structural positions of
actors within an organizational field or an arena of action at
49 David J. Hess & Jonathan S. Coley, Wireless Smart Meters and Public
Acceptance: The Environment, Limited Choices, and Precautionary Politics, 23 PUB.
UNDERSTANDING SCI. 688 (2014).
50 Hoffman, supra note 12, at 351.
51 W. Richard Scott, Unpacking Institutional Arrangements, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991).
52 Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and the Theory of Fields, 19 SOC. THEORY 105,
107 (2001).
53 Field theory originated in physics and was imported into the social sciences
in the 1940s, most notably by psychologist Kurt Lewin. See KURT LEWIN, FIELD
THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL PAPERS (Dorwin Cartwright ed.,
1951). Key sources in the sociology of fields and field theory include: BOURDIEU, supra
note 13; Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147
(1983); and John Levi Martin, What Is Field Theory?, 109 AM. J. SOC. 1 (2003).
54 In sociology, analyses are often designated by their scope or level, with
“micro-level” referring to studies of small group interactions, “meso-level” referring to
interactions among different communities or formal organizations, and “macro-level”
referring to studies of interactions among entire societies, populations, or nation-states.
For general discussion of these distinctions, see DOYLE PAUL JOHNSON, CONTEMPORARY
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY: AN INTEGRATED MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH (2008).
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the level of a collective.55 Studying the production of social
order within and among organizations permits analysts to
more precisely understand how social dynamics spread in the
aggregate, and how norms, practices, and relationships are
challenged, resisted, altered, and institutionalized.56
Field theory is sensitive to actors’ ability to induce
cooperation among other actors within that social order; in other
words, it is sensitive to power.57 It is sufficiently broad to capture
a range of relevant actors but also fine-tuned enough to assess
relational influences among those actors. Unlike the idea of an
institutional logic—which is a relatively fixed set of ideas and
relationships among actors58—a field frame sees that political
action in a field can be consequential.59 It allows analysts to
appreciate, for example, how the transition to a more sustainable
energy system does not rest solely on the development of new
technologies, the decisions of a particular actor, the ruling of a
particular court, or passage of a particular law. Instead, the
analysis focuses on the actions of the field as a whole—as the
collective patterns of relations among a diverse and changing set
of actors.60 Field theory thus offers an as-yet untapped
opportunity for deeper sociological understanding of the halting
energy transition now underway in Washington and elsewhere.
The defining characteristic of a field analysis is the study
of the struggles among actors.61 Fields are “meso-level social
order[s]” through which individual and collective actors “interact
with one another on the basis of shared . . . understandings about
the purposes of the field, the relationships to others in the field
(including who has power and why), and the rules governing
legitimate action in the field.”62 Defined as such, fields are
characterized by ongoing struggles among actors to define a
field’s boundaries, criteria for membership, and internal power
relations. Fields are highly dynamic social spaces where “what
55 See, e.g., Gregg P. Macey, Boundary Work in Environmental Law, 53
HOUS. L. REV. 103, 103 (2015) (This article presents a framework for the study of
environmental law that emphasizes the institutional arrangements that set and shift
boundaries.).
56 This approach is illustrated by Beth Bechky’s study of knowledge-sharing
among engineers, technicians, and managers in a large high-tech company. Beth A.
Bechky, Sharing Meaning Across Occupational Communities: The Transformation of
Understanding on a Production Floor, 14 ORG. SCI. 312, 312 (2003).
57 Fligstein, supra note 52, at 106–07.
58 Royston Greenwood et al., The Multiplicity of Institutional Logics and the
Heterogeneity of Organizational Responses, 21 ORG. SCI. 521, 522 (2010).
59 Michael Lounsbury et al., Social Movements, Field Frames and Industry
Emergence: A Cultural-Political Perspective on US Recycling, 1 SOC.-ECON. REV. 71 (2003).
60 See generally FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 17.
61 Fligstein, supra note 52, at 107.
62 FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 17, at 9.
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is at stake” in the field is not given, but contested, not static, but
changing.63 These struggles illuminate how practices evolve and
are institutionalized across organizations within the field;64 they
provide insight into the evolution of a field’s values and practices.
Importantly for the present article, fields are
interrelated, multilevel social structures. Not only is each field
composed of different kinds of actors, but fields themselves
function in relation to other fields.65 In the present case, the
smart meter field is nested within larger fields defined by the
smart grid system and by the geopolitical boundaries of
Washington State. Fields can also share some actors in common
with geographically proximate fields, such as tech firms based in
Oregon or Canada and regional and national associations (such
as the Smart Grid Consumer Collaborative). Moreover, fields
can be constrained by rules set by “exogenous” regulatory bodies
such as the Western Electric Coordinating Council and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.66 Fields can share
actors with associated fields (think of the overlap in a Venn
diagram), and smaller fields can be nested within larger ones.
For instance, cooperatively owned utilities, as a field, are nested
within the larger field of energy generation.
When fields are “settled” or stable, actors tend to share
similar understandings of what is desirable and have a relatively
clear understanding of their particular role within the social
order. They can coordinate action because they share taken-forgranted “understandings of what constitutes legitimate goals and
how they may be pursued.”67 These taken-for-granted
understandings inform organizational behavior, delineating what
actors deem desirable, establishing norms and values, and
mediating meaning and sense-making. In unsettled times,
however, when fields are undergoing rapid change, actors’
63 PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE
SOCIOLOGY 111–12 (1992).
64 See Macey, supra note 55 (offering a theoretical framework for thinking
about how institutions mediate boundaries, and how practices and boundaries are
instantiated in institutions).
65 See generally FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 17 (providing a
comprehensive outline of field theory).
66 See generally JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC
POWER SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY, THE MARKETPLACE, AND
GOVERNMENT REGULATION (2d ed. 2010).
67 Julie Battilana & Silvia Dorado, Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations:
The Case of Commercial Microfinance Organizations, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1419, 1420
(2010). For instance, there are several types of energy generating utilities: municipal
utilities (publicly held, and whose aim is to provide energy at cost), co-ops, and investorowned utilities. Taken-for-granted norms in one type of utility may not hold in others. An
investor-owned utility will take for granted that its first mandate is to generate profit for
its shareholders; municipal utilities may operate under a different logic.
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shared understandings are called into question and often
contested. In turn, when actors do not enjoy shared, or at least
compatible, norms, ideals, and goals that help them make
sense of their own and others’ actions, they are less likely to
coordinate and cooperate.68
Field theory offers a particularly useful way for legal
and policy scholars to understand and explain institutional
changes in areas of law and policy that are dynamically
influenced by emerging technologies. Its emphasis on social
order and struggle permits analysts to recognize how new
practices—not just new laws or new policies—are developed
and institutionalized. Moreover, by focusing on conflict and
competition over resources, the theory offers an alternative to
the conventional wisdom that fields are formed primarily
around market opportunities69 and invites analysts to consider
the relational contexts that shape struggles across a broad but
historically and socially constructed domain: the field.
Specifically, in our case, a field-level analysis permits us to
emphasize mechanisms that institutionalize meaning around
smart meters and understand organizational behavior via
processes of meaning-making and framing. One way to chart
this progression is to analyze how different actors in the field
promote different understandings or “visions” of smart meters
in greening the grid and reorganizing electricity distribution.
B.

Technological Vision

As conceptualized by organization behavior theorists, a
technological vision is not the same as an organization’s goals
or plans, which tend to be “more concrete, short-term, and
limited in scope.”70 Nor are visions composed of the outlandish
ideas of fantasy or science fiction. Instead, those who share
visions see them as “imaginable and feasible” future
organizational-level achievements.71 Visions operate at the mesoscale within organizations, but “overarching visions” can also
operate at a macro-level.72 At the field level, such visions
68 Dierkes et al., supra note 11, at 285. For instance, “net neutrality” is
something of an unsettled field in the sense that its taken-for-granted ends vary by
actors. Some may understand the ultimate goal of net neutrality to be free, public
internet service; others may understand the term as nondiscrimination in access and
pricing based on user, content, website, platform, application, or mode of communication.
Though not necessarily incommensurate, these two visions are substantially different.
69 Hoffman, supra note 12, at 351.
70 Dierkes et al., supra note 11, at 284.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 285.
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“transcend boundaries” to integrate organizational actors and
guide collective action toward a shared future. Well-known
examples of overarching visions include the “paperless office”73
or the fully automated factory as depicted with dystopic charm
in Kurt Vonnegut’s 1952 novel Player Piano.74 The “internet of
things” (IoT) is another example.75 As an overarching vision,
IoT describes an emerging future society in which “the virtual
world of information technology integrates seamlessly with the
real world of things.”76 General visions help create stability in
the field by permitting actors to develop expectations and
recognize their shared interests and common definitions.
Thus, identifying the visions of field actors is a useful
first step toward understanding field dynamics—in our case,
the changing smart meter field. For the potential of smart
meters and related technologies to be fully realized, a variety of
actors—utilities, technology companies, researchers, regulators,
and the like—will need to coordinate and cooperate. Such
coordination is unlikely to occur when actors do not enjoy shared,
or at least compatible, visions.77 Accordingly, our research asked:
to what extent do organizational actors in the smart meter field
share a common technological vision? To what extent are the
technological visions these actors articulate different in important
respects? In the smart meter field, is there evidence of a shared
vision that is shaping interorganizational dynamics and guiding
organizational action? Or is something else happening?
We begin to investigate these questions by analyzing
how different key actors in the field describe smart meters, the
role smart meters will likely play in an as-yet-unrealized smart
energy system, and the challenges those same technologies create
for the field. Interviews conducted with smart meter field actors
find that many share a rough overarching vision of the smart grid
as an IoT. As we describe below, our interviewees carry an IoT
vision of the smart grid, imagining a self-sufficient, automated
73 Id.; EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
REVENGE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (1996).
74 See generally KURT VONNEGUT, PLAYER PIANO (1952). Revolving around
the life of Dr. Paul Proteus, a mechanical engineer and mid-level manager at Ilium
Works, the novel sketches a near future society in which machine automation replaces
not only factory workers, but technically-trained managers as well. The increasing
obsolescence of human ingenuity and labor ultimately gives rise to class conflict, with
Proteus and other knowledge workers caught in the middle.
75 SAMUEL GREENGARD, THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2015). The Internet of
Things is a system of networking by which objects communicate digitally to collect,
exchange, and utilize data, absent any human intervention.
76 ARCHITECTING THE I NTERNET OF T HINGS 2 (Dieter Uckelmann et al.
eds., 2011).
77 DIERKES ET AL., supra note 11, at 284–88.

2017]

FIELD OF VISIONS

707

power grid with machine-to-machine communication that,
when fully achieved, will be largely independent of human
interaction (and thus largely devoid of human error and other
such inefficiencies). In this technological vision of a new kind of
society, when making decisions, regulators will be increasingly
aided by machines—including smart meters and their associated
infrastructure—that actors in the field are designing, building,
implementing, and integrating. While they may share a general
vision, within the context of their own organizations, field actors
articulated quite different visions of what smart meters mean
and how their implementation is likely to change how the
overall field will work.
III.

METHODS AND DATA

Our analysis is based on evidence from semi-structured
interviews with thirty-two individuals representing Washingtonbased technology firms, university and national laboratories,
electrical utilities, and various consumer advocates. We used a
purposive (i.e. nonrandom) sampling process, using existing
contacts to gain access to organizational actors.
Our nonrandom sample includes twenty-five men and
seven women, nearly all serving in some leadership or
managerial position within their organizations.78 We focused our
efforts on people in leadership positions because they often have
unique interdepartmental insight and a broad understanding of
different job responsibilities. Additionally, they are involved in
decision making. Nineteen interview partners have earned postgraduate degrees; four have PhDs. Two-thirds of the individuals
we interviewed are seasoned professionals (forty-one to sixty
years old), and many have held previous positions in the
electrical energy sector. The in-person interviews were
conducted in 2014 and involved a semi-structured question
format that ranged in length from thirty to ninety minutes.
After transcribing the audio interviews, we conducted a basic
content analysis of the resulting transcriptions to identify major
conceptual themes, including technological vision. To maintain
confidentiality, we use pseudonyms, redact informants’ specific
job titles, locations, and, in some cases, the types of
organizations they represent. Together, these interviews offer a
window into the ways that competing visions are shaping
Washington’s emerging smart meter field, which we explore in
the following analysis.
78

(n=28).
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RESULTS

Several interviewees representing different types of
organizations shared an understanding of the smart grid as a
self-sufficient, automated grid featuring real-time machine-tomachine communication. In many of their responses,
interviewees equated the smart grid with the IoT or saw the grid
as an element of the IoT or closely related to it. This rough
overarching vision of the IoT is apparent in several of the quotes
we use below to develop our analysis. As these quotes also show,
actors’ technological visions differed in substantial ways, as
described in Table 2. Field theory suggests that such differences
may reflect differences in actors’ positions and power in the
smart meter field79 and point to the changing structure of
relations within it. This section describes the technological
visions espoused by field actors working in utilities, academic
labs, technology firms, and government regulatory agencies in
greater detail, focusing on how the different visions identified in
Table 2 reflect changing field conditions overall.
TABLE 2. Technological Visions of Smart Meter Field Actors

A.

Field Actors

Technological Vision
“Internet of Things”

Utilities

Energy efficiency

Academic R&D Labs

Automated, self-operating
grid

Regulators

Democratization

Technology Firms

Interoperability

Utility Companies

Utilities have historically been dominant players in
energy provision. Traditionally, utilities were monopsony actors
with an obligation to ensure that electricity flowed to consumers
in a reliable way at a reasonable price—a price that allowed the
79 See generally BOURDIEU, supra note 13 (French social theorist Pierre
Bourdieu was a seminal thinker within field theory and paid particular attention to
issues of position and power in his work.).

2017]

FIELD OF VISIONS

709

utility to remain in business.80 While utility companies do still
care about their bottom lines, they also acknowledge their
broader social responsibility. A utility manager described this
social responsibility mission this way:
[W]e like to be advocates for our customers and have them use our
product wisely so that their bills are lower. The simple fact of the
matter is, our economy is stronger if our customers have more
disposable income. For the residential customer, that means they
can cycle their money through other parts of the economy rather
than through us. For a business customer, it means they can be more
competitive with their competitors elsewhere if their rates are lower
and if their bills are lower. We are made whole through our
regulatory cost recovery mechanisms. Also, customers like to be
green and be sustainable. And we can help them do that.81

Utilities’ interest in providing reliable power at a
reasonable cost is reflected in their perceptions of the smart
grid. The utility managers tend to hold a vision of the smart
grid that valorizes economic efficiency. For these actors, the
smart grid offers a practical way to avoid the costs of additional
energy generation by using what is currently being produced
more efficiently through flexible “load management.” As one
utility manager described it:
When you lower the voltage, it reduces the load on the system. So for
the first time—that’s the flexible grid concept—we can actually
impact load without just simply matching it with generation. We can
impact it through conservation voltage reduction. So the idea is, if
you reduce the load, . . . [y]ou reduce the need for new generation. So
there’s an avoided cost of new generation. And so that becomes the
[new] economic model.82

In this quote, incorporating smart meters into the utility’s business
model represents cost savings through flexible load management.
Similarly, another utility manager noted that
“traditionally, we’d have a higher voltage [in town, near the
power substation] and anybody outside of the town . . . would get
a normal voltage, but people inside the town still get a higher
voltage [i.e., more power than they need].”83 This uneven
distribution ensures the necessary voltage range across the grid
but also represents cost inefficiency. The same manager
continued, “one of the things that we’re trying to do is better
understand the voltage characteristics so we can lower the
80 See generally CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 66; DAVID E. NYE,
ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY, 1880–1940 (1990).
81 Interview with Utility Manager 32, in Wash. pp. 3–4, ll. 9–6 (Apr. 2014).
82 Interview with Utility Manager 25, in Wash. p. 15, ll. 2–15 (Apr. 2014).
83 Interview with Utility Manager 27, in Wash. p. 18, ll. 15–22 (Apr. 2014).
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voltage to a better operating point, so consumers use less
energy, so we don’t have to make as much energy, another
long-term societal benefit.”84 In this comment, the manager
expressed his company’s desire to lower its voltage level to a
more efficient operating point, in which consumers would not
have to use as much energy, and the company would be able, in
turn, to produce less. Less energy production translates into
short-term cost savings to the producer (in this case, the utility
in question is a power generator and distributor), but it also
means that the utility can meet the rising demand for energy
without having to make huge and long-term investments in
new power plants. Instead, they meet rising demand for power
by more efficiently distributing the electricity they already
generate. With these efficiency gains, utilities can claim to
reduce the draw-down on natural resource use—especially coal,
which is still the major energy source in the United States85—
and contribute to a more environmentally sustainable energy
system in the long run.86
This technological vision also promises economic efficiencies
on the consumers’ end, especially regarding the service that
utilities can now provide to businesses and homeowners. For
example, one utility management representative, with a technical
background, described how his utility’s updated grid technology
was able to respond to a power outage in a local shopping mall.
What traditionally took several hours could be restored within
minutes.87 The self-automated grid function allowed technicians
to quickly isolate the affected area and fix the problem, thus
avoiding a large negative financial consequence for mall retailers.

84
85

(May 2014).

Id.
Interview with Academic Research Engineer 06, in Wash. p. 18, ll. 13–21

86 Several managers describe how the utilities’ efficiency programs help to
realize this vision and also respond to consumers’ desire for renewable and green
sources. Interview with Technology Firm Manager 24, in Wash. p. 14, ll. 17–24 (Nov.
2014); Interview with Utility Manager 32, supra note 81, at pp. 3–4, ll. 9–6; Interview
with Academic Research Engineer 17, in Wash. p. 8, ll. 12–16 (Nov. 2014); Interview
with Technology Firm Manager 26, in Wash. pp. 9–10, ll. 22–26 (Nov. 2014).
87 The manager continued:

[G]etting [power to the mall] back on as quickly as possible, I think, is a real
economic benefit to them. And so we had the smart grid area there. And so it
automatically isolated the fault and then restored customers upstream. And
that takes a couple minutes to do, all that configuration. And then the report
came out to suggest what they should do downstream. And I think it was
within, like, 10 minutes that they had the downstream restored, had most of
the mall back on with power, so it was pretty exciting to see that.
Interview with Utility Manager 31, in Wash. p. 10, ll. 10–16 (Apr. 2014).
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In addition to potential increases in efficiency and
sustainability and improvements in customer service, grid
modernization also poses serious challenges for utilities.
However, as one research engineer pointed out, “I think that is
the smart part [of a smart grid] because, instead of having one
power company making all the decisions about supply and
demand, now you have everybody collectively making decisions
under one mechanism [i.e. smart metering].”88 Thus, utilities
perceive that the smart grid may result in less centralized
decision making—and less utility control. This shift is likely to
fundamentally alter utilities’ relations with other field actors.
One example of the new contributions of nonutility actors is that
consumers themselves are becoming producers—or “prosumers.”89
In the face of consumer pressure for green energy, “Wal-Mart,
Yahoo, Microsoft, Kohl’s, Boeing are all putting [small-scale
renewable power] generation in.”90 Household customers are also
driving electric vehicles and putting solar panels on their roofs. As
a senior engineer described it to us, the move to small-scale,
renewable power generation is not currently cost-effective in
Washington, but the tide is turning. Given increased electricity
generation by consumers, it is unclear what business model
utilities will need to adopt. As one utility manager told us, the
traditional business model “doesn’t work very well because, if
someone else starts building [AMI, or smart meter] infrastructure
and [generating their own power], what happens is, then there’s
less revenue for the company in regards to utility bills and less
need for [an] upgraded [power] plant.”91 On the other hand,
“people who can’t afford that new generation at their house
essentially are burdened with that cost. Right? The same cost has
to be covered. So I think there will be a lot of challenges in that.”92
Another utility representative put the point in even
stronger terms, though still framing the grid as a common
resource that must be paid for by traditional energy distribution:
So it’s a very different world that we’re playing in now . . . the utility
is essential because you couldn’t put enough solar, you couldn’t put
enough wind out there to cover all of the needs. There’s just not
enough rooftops. There’s not. And industrial loads that require big
energy—so you need the grid. But you need the grid to be viable. So
88

27, ll. 25–4.

Interview with Academic Research Engineer 06, supra note 85, at pp. 26–

89 Per Goncalves Da Silva et al., A Survey Towards Understanding
Residential Prosumers in Smart Grid Neighbourhoods, in 2012 3RD IEEE PES:
INNOVATIVE SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES EUROPE (ISGT EUROPE) 1–8 (2012).
90 Interview with Utility Manager 11, in Wash. pp. 26–27, ll. 16–4 (Apr. 2014).
91 Interview with Utility Manager 25, supra note 82, at pp. 8–9, ll. 23–7.
92 Id.

712

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

you need enough people paying for the grid. Otherwise, it’ll be too
expensive for anybody. So we’re in a scary spot where [companies are
adopting micro-generators] in essence to try and not pay for the grid,
even though we’ll be there to back them up.93

Both passages above suggest that the transition to a
sustainable and green energy system is very much driven by
social and economic factors, even as alternative visions for the
energy future emerge. While the latter quotation suggests
something of a “tragedy of the commons” scenario,94 the essential
dilemma in both is a desire for distributed generation coupled
with a need for a costly, centralized grid. Thus, utilities see the
potential the smart grid offers for efficiency gains, but they also
recognize that these gains may come with a loss of control and
threats to profits. These challenges are unsettling the field and
altering power relations among field actors.
B.

Research Laboratories

Government and university researchers and engineers
are not identified as strongly with consumers or constrained by
market dynamics as are utilities. Instead, researchers seek to
accumulate “scientific capital,”95 which often takes the form of
new grants, publications, conference presentations, awards,
and—a practice specific to the smart grid field—the design and
implementation of smart meter demonstration projects.96 All of
these practices advance a lab’s credibility in the eyes of fellow
academics, university administrators, and funding agencies, as
well as to other organizational actors in the smart meter field.97
In their ongoing efforts to accumulate scientific capital,
academic engineers and computer scientists work under
intense pressure, but it is a very different kind of pressure than
that which other actors in the field face. They are, as one

Interview with Utility Manager 11, supra note 90, at pp. 27–28, ll. 19–14.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244
(1968). The “tragedy of the commons” is an economic theory of social behavior within a
shared-resource system, wherein individual users, acting independently and according
to their own self-interest, behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting
that common resource through their individual actions and consumption. See id.
95 PIERRE BOURDIEU, SCIENCE OF SCIENCE AND REFLEXIVITY 55–56 (Richard
Nice trans., 2004).
96 See examples within PAC. NW. SMART GRID DEMONSTRATION PROJECT,
SUCCESS STORIES (2014), https://www.bpa.gov/Projects/Initiatives/SmartGrid/Documents
SmartGrid/Success-Stories-Avista.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQP8-NX7A].
97 For elaboration on field theory, see generally BOURDIEU, supra note 95.
93
94
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researcher put it, “free to envision what could happen by
[using] new technologies.”98
And this freedom—itself a form of pressure to produce
novel findings and innovative technologies—builds scientific
capital. Unfettered by the daily concerns of business operations
and schedules, researchers tend to have more resources to
elaborate visions of the future smart grid, in the abstract. “But
research is our business,”99 one engineer continued. “So we have
more responsibility to think outside the box, figure out
something.”100 “Thinking outside the box,” as this researcher
phrased it, signals a new position for researchers in relation to
the shifting role of utilities that are searching for a new
business model to make new technologies work in older “boxes.”
Unlike utilities, the research labs have little to lose from
short-term failure and much to gain in terms of acquiring new
knowledge about the limits of the technological systems they
are designing. Indeed, their participation in demonstration
projects can reveal surprising “side effects”101 in the sense that
every new technology creates unintended and often paradoxical
consequences when unleashed into the real world. One
researcher described such an “a-ha” moment during a
demonstration project when he came to understand the
paradoxical side effect of what he called the “vampire load” that
smart meters draw from the system:
[Smart meters] are electronic devices. Therefore, unlike mechanical
metering, the devices themselves consume power. So even if every
[meter used just] a watt, by the time we replace millions of
electromechanical devices with these, then you have a vampire load
of, in the U.S., 100 million households, approximately 100 million
watts even if they’re one watt each.102

Smart meters are designed to increase energy efficiency
but to do so they must also consume energy. This vampire load
paradox complicates the question of whether commercial
consumers gain energy efficiency from implementing smart
meters and makes it difficult to make a simple business case
for large-scale implementation. A similarly paradoxical side
effect involves assumptions about labor cost savings: Smart
98

32, ll. 16–2.

Interview with Academic Research Engineer 06, supra note 85, at pp. 31–

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
101 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological
Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties, in ENVIRONMENT 269 (Jules
Pretty ed., 2006).
102 Interview with Consumer Advocate 10, in Wash. p. 7, ll. 19–1 (Nov. 2014).
99

100
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meters will replace highly paid meter reading employees, but
the new system will require a whole new set of specialists (such
as data analysts and software engineers) to design, set up, and
maintain the system.103 These new specialists often do not show
up on utilities’ payrolls because they are outsourced.104 So, do
smart meters in fact save on labor costs, or are these costs
merely shifted to different areas where they become less visible
and harder to accurately calculate? These side effects are the
kinds of problems that vastly complicate the business case for
smart meters and make life difficult for regulators but that
researchers often find intriguing.
Thus, while concerned about grid efficiency and
reliability, the data presented above shows that researchers
are also techno-utopians who see a fully automated, selfoperating smart grid as a way to advance the transition to a
sustainable energy system. Whereas utilities managers and
directors idealize smart meters as efficiency-generating tools
that feature in a more economically robust and
environmentally sustainable energy system, the researchers we
interviewed hold a more critical view of this technology.
Inhabiting the front lines of technological R&D, these
researchers draw on their practical experience setting up and
studying smart meter pilot projects to question the technological
and economic significance of smart meters.105 Engineers are
fluent in this technology and have a specific vision of its promise;
their concerns reflect the idea that an imperfect intermediate
technology (the smart meter) may ultimately inhibit progression
towards the desired end. “I don’t think that they are a good
gateway to a house or a building,”106 said one university
researcher. This engineer noted that there are “other choices
that would probably be better than the meter,”107 observing that
the smart meter made “a good cash register, but I don’t think it’s
a good energy management system.”108
One reason that smart meters, as currently designed, are
not good energy management systems is that while they
communicate with the utility, they do not actually communicate
directly with the retail consumer despite widespread public
103 Interview with Academic Research Engineer 19, in Wash. p. 16, ll. 8–12
(Mar. 2014); Interview with Utility Manager 03, in Wash. p. 11, ll. 8–24 (May 2014).
104 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 30, in Wash. p. 19, ll. 12–4
(Nov. 2014).
105 Interview with Utility Manager 11, supra note 90, at pp. 26–27, ll. 16–4.
106 Interview with Academic Research Engineer 07, in Wash. pp. 7–8, ll. 24–3
(Nov. 2014).
107 Id.
108 Id.
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perceptions109 that they can.110 At present, consumers need access
to additional complementary devices (such as smart thermostats
or smart appliances) that provide real-time information for
managing their energy usage.111 For academic engineers, smart
meter design and implementation thus fall well short of their
potential. One senior engineer complained,
AMI was supposed to be the gateway to demand response.112 How
come we’re not rolling out demand response at the same time? If I
am at the house putting in a meter, why am I not handing out
[smart] thermostats at the same time or when am I going to do this?
And we are installing communication networks for the AMI systems
that are too weak to do steps two, three, four, and five.113

This researcher sees the current situation as a cheaper but, in
his words, “short-sighted” investment in AMI deployments that
give insufficient attention and investment to future technologies.
He continued:
And to the extent that, [the] network can be beefed up later at no
extra marginal cost for doing it incrementally, then I guess we’re
fine, but I’m very concerned that that’s not the case, that when you
want to upgrade the communication network, you’re basically
throwing out the old one and all the costs associated with that and
putting in a new one.114

Seen
impediment
the future
researcher

this way, smart meters are something of an
to the system that research engineers envision for
smart grid. Such a technological vision, one
noted, “would be more proactive instead of

109 Chris Mooney, Why 50 Million Smart Meters Still Haven’t Fixed America’s
Energy Habits, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2015/01/29/americans-are-this-close-to-finally-understandingtheir-electricity-bills/ [https://perma.cc/436K-D9SW].
110 For instance, President Obama at the 2015 National Clean Energy Summit
claimed that:

Six years ago, smart meters were pretty rare. Today, 60 million consumers
have access to detailed information about how much energy we use, how we
use it, when we use it. So we can use that information to change our habits,
use energy more efficiently, save more money without a whole lot of sacrifice.
Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at National Clean Energy
Summit (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/25/remarkspresident-national-clean-energy-summit [https://perma.cc/K9SY-XM6A].
111 Mooney, supra note 109; see also Interview with Academic Research
Engineer 17, supra note 86, at pp. 13–14.
112 “Demand response” programs refer to efforts by utility companies to manage
customer demand—for example, by providing incentives to shift electricity use to
nonpeak times. Demand Response, DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/oe/services/
technology-development/smart-grid/demand-response [https://perma.cc/H4KP-5F4T].
113 Interview with Academic Research Engineer 17, supra note 86, at pp. 13–14.
114 Id.
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reactive.”115 In this techno-utopian future, data aggregation
protocols put in place to protect consumer privacy would mean
that “[t]he household where the advanced meter resides would
not be unique in its location and how it interacts in the system.”116
Thus, in addition to protecting consumers’ privacy, a seamlessly
engineered grid that collects data but also continually updates
and analyzes data at different scales of aggregation could
maximize not just economic efficiency, but bureaucratic,
technological, and environmental efficiency as well. Concerning
energy costs, for example,
what’s now done through external billing processes and still really
only done once a month on some random day near the end of the
month, if it’s checked at all, could become quite organic to this part
of the system if every location is keeping track of what it’s done . . . .
You would be providing methods for inserting incentives [e.g. to
boost demand response] in ways that are much more dynamic and
informed than [they are] now.117

Embedded in this quote is the real promise that
researchers see for the smart grid: an “organic” system, one that
is fully integrated, fully automated, and self-correcting, with
maximally efficient algorithms all but replacing error-prone and
bureaucratically deficient human decision makers.118 According to
the views of many laboratory researchers, the current attention
given to smart meters sells this techno-utopian vision short.
C.

Consumer Advocate Agencies

For those whose role is protecting consumers, the grid is
an opportunity to expand customer access to information and
ensure fairness in pricing. In describing his technological vision,
one consumer advocate said, “I envision . . . smart meters as the
lynchpin of [the internet of things].”119 In this vision, smart meters
are democratizing tools because they have the potential to bring
the locus of decision making closer to the public. He continued,
115 Interview with Academic Research Engineer 18, in Wash. p. 25, l. 4
(Nov. 2014).
116 Id. at p. 25, ll. 4–7.
117 Id. at pp. 24–25, ll. 21–20.
118 See generally Emma Marris, Upgrading the Grid, 454 NATURE 570–73
(2008) and STEPHENS et al., supra note 4 for discussion on how smart grid and demand
management technologies are co-evolving in a way that would permit electricity to
spontaneously reroute itself along any other path it can find if a transmission line goes
dead. It is also worth noting that this vision sees human intervention—in the form of
regulators, etc.—as bureaucratic, inefficient, and ultimately harmful to the development
of a more perfect energy market. This engineering perspective implies a political vision
that is very different from smart-grid-as-democratization notions of the regulators.
119 Interview with Consumer Advocate 10, supra note 102, at pp. 24–25, ll. 575–578.
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I think that smart meters that are two-way communication
enabled . . . really are the keys because that will allow the customers
to really take control of their usage, to understand what their
behaviors are, to be able to see beyond . . . those 15-minute
increments, what their usage is [and] be able to understand that,
“When I use this device, my power shoots way up,” or, “Does this
device add this effect?”120

In line with the vision of smart meters as a democratizing tool, a
highly communicative meter will provide customers with dynamic
information that can contribute to consumption decisions multiple
times a day in every smart-meter equipped household. In addition
to providing customers with information, smart meters also allow
regulators and utilities to communicate via prices. As one
consumer advocate explained: “[Smart meters] will enable us to
move maybe towards more not necessarily real-time pricing, but
move them in a direction to have a closer time between what’s
going on, on the grid and what their customer is paying.”121
While one respondent stated that regulators’ primary
role is to control technology (i.e. to “stop things from
happening”122), most of our research participants expressed a
more democratic vision involving a move away from a commandand-control regulatory structure and toward a more open and
flexible governance arrangement among power companies,
utilities, and regulators. This move is reflected in a discussion
that one consumer advocate had with a utility company, whose
representatives informed him that,
they were going forward with their smart grid implementation . . . .
But [the company was] talking with us about what their plans were,
what their findings were, and doing the research before they started
implementation and to get our ideas . . . . [The company] just wanted
us to be understanding where they were going with it.123

These comments by our respondents suggest that, in the
long term, regulators may have less control than they do now. A
fully automated smart grid—the kind envisioned by the
researchers we described earlier—will be able to use algorithms,
machine learning, and real-time power usage data to set and
update electricity prices automatically. In this scenario, the
work that is currently conducted by regulators will be
increasingly accomplished by machine algorithms. In the
technocratic utopia envisioned by engineers and computer
scientists—which many see as technologically achievable
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at p. 25, ll. 582–598.
Interview with Academic Research Engineer 18, supra note 115, at p. 25, l. 4.
Interview with Consumer Advocate 10, supra note 102, at p. 21, ll. 478–486.
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today124—market mechanisms, rather than regulators, determine
prices. In this idealized future, the field would operate in a highly
computer-intensive environment. This vision understands human
actions and decisions as unnecessary “interventions” and looks
toward the possibility of a perfect market and a better energy
system overall, facilitated by computer algorithms.125
In the near term, however, regulators in particular face a
practical and pressing set of concerns: how to assess the value of
smart meters for customers and set prices that appropriately
reflect smart meter costs and benefits. Such challenges are
reflected in the comment of one analyst regarding the effect
smart meters are likely to have on the consumer rate:
[T]here is a desire to not have prices fluctuate wildly and frequently.
So from that perspective, there is some interest in having a stable
price, but I think, overarching it, [there is] sort of a dual mandate.
One is to make sure that companies are kept whole financially. The
other is to make sure that ratepayers don’t have to pay any more
than [necessary]. So it’s a balance.126

Such a balance is not easily achieved. Regulators are often
overworked and understaffed and, therefore, frequently take
cues on technological issues from engineers and computer
scientists at universities and national laboratories and from
utilities.127 In addition, the value of smart meters for customers
is difficult to assess.128 Thus, regulators lack the information
they need to weigh potential benefits against the price increases
that pay for smart meter roll-out.
D.

Technology Firms

Finally, technology firms supply the smart grid’s
proprietary hardware and software, and increasingly, ongoing
services.129 These firms seek competitive advantage in the

124 This claim emerged independently in several discussions we have had with
smart meter field actors.
125 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 16, in Wash. p. 18, ll. 1–16
(Nov. 2014).
126 Interview with Consumer Advocate 10, supra note 102, at p. 18, ll. 412–425.
127 Interview with Utility Manager 31, supra note 87, at pp. 27–28, ll. 16–1;
Interview with Academic Research Engineer 17, supra note 86, at. pp. 41–42, ll. 20–5.
128 Interview with Academic Research Engineer 19, in Wash. pp. 14–15, ll. 25–
20 (Mar. 2014).
129 As we were told in interviews, tech firms that are now offering individual
products, like meters, see the future value of providing “whole solutions” that would
include products but also services that help ensure data communication flow, such as
leasing as business models or data analytics. Interview with Technology Firm Manager
22, in Wash. p. 26, ll. 16–25 (Nov. 2014).
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changing smart grid market.130 They pursue strategies that will
earn profits in the near term and position them for future
growth.131 Traditionally, the energy system has been a field that
makes only incremental innovations; our data show that safety,
reliability, and legal concerns allow only gradual technological
developments. Thus, “for us, and our competitors,” said one highlevel executive, “everything is hard, and slow, and expensive.”132
One of the main impediments to the development
towards the IoT version of the future grid is the lack of
“interoperability”—the ability of different kinds of smart devices
to communicate with one another in an open system.133 At
present, such a system does not exist because there is not one
single standard for machines to communicate with one
another.134 Instead, all technologies designed to operate on the
grid remain proprietary. In the short term, this situation can
work to the advantage of individual firms: proprietary
technologies keep utilities dependent on a single supplier, and
utilities cannot begin purchasing technologies from other firms
without changing their entire infrastructure. “[W]ith a
proprietary solution, the only person you can get that solution
from is the vendor that originally provided it,” said one company
representative.135 With an open system that is unified by
technological standards for software and hardware, however,
“two vendors that have both implemented that standard should
be able to interoperate with each other. And so at that point, it
becomes open because anybody can participate in that broader
ecosystem.”136 In this vision, standardization will enable
communication between a virtually limitless number of devices.
While the lack of interoperability may generate significant
short-term profits for a select number of suppliers, over the long
term, it represents a major challenge to widespread
implementation of smart meter technology. Standardization
130 INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT
SMART GRID: A MARKET ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR U.S. EXPORTERS 9 (2016), http://trade.gov/
topmarkets/pdf/Smart_Grid_Top_Markets_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9V7-BU7G].
131 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 14, in Wash. pp. 30–31, ll. 8–7
(Nov. 2014).
132 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 30, supra note 104, at p. 23, ll.
12–20.
133 Interview with Technology Firm Engineer 13, in Wash. p. 2, ll. 16–23, pp.
9–10, ll. 184–207 (Nov. 2014); Interview with Technology Firm Manager 16, supra note
125, at p. 17, ll. 5–15.
134 Interview with Academic Research Engineer 08, in Wash. pp. 36–37, ll. 12–
22 (Apr. 2014); Interview with Technology Firm Manager 02, in Wash. p. 13, ll. 8–25
(Mar. 2014).
135 Interview with Technology Firm Engineer 13, supra note 133, at p. 9, ll.
184–191.
136 Id.
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toward interoperability is an evolving process requiring a level of
coordination that does not presently exist in the field. As one
respondent described it, “[the] Coalition of the Willing137 have
this vision for how the grid will work in the future and they are
trying to get a whole bunch of different vendors to buy into that
vision. And it’s driven around getting pretty much everything
speaking the same protocol.”138 But, as this respondent
suggests, to envision and move towards interoperability is a
fundamentally political process with high economic stakes.
Our research shows that major questions remain about
whose technology will become the standard for the field and what
this will mean for the development of proprietary technologies.
For tech firms trying to do business in this uncertain field,
survival is not assured. A company representative spoke
eloquently about this dilemma:
I think everyone, for the most part, sees this as whether or not they
are going to be able to sell their proprietary system. They also see
that there’s at least some part of the market that’s going to demand
a standards-based system. And so I think everybody . . . recognizes
that, whether you believe it’s the right way or not, it’s going to be the
price of entry in some places. And so it’s best to have some input into
that standard than to leave it to the competitors that have to have it.
And what happens in the standards bodies . . . is, each company
that’s participating in that standard is participating first to make
sure their interests are protected and then, second, make sure that it
evolves into something that’s going to work.139

This respondent’s emphasis on protection and survival
underscores the uncertainty of survival in such an unsettled field
and demonstrates the preexisting, largely financial stakes for
those who have already invested in technology and technology
development. In addition, this unsettled field lends a boom-orbust character to the market, adding considerable uncertainty to
the mix. Another company representative described his firm’s
recent experience within a topsy-turvy market:
We had a real burst of activity when we had the ARRA . . . stimulus
funding in 2010 through 2012. And so we had kind of a real spike in
activity during that period of time, when there was stimulus funding
from the U.S. government. And that’s all gone away now. That’s all
done. And so now, utilities have to justify [their decisions] on the

137 Here the speaker is referring to members of the Institute for Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, or IEEE, a major professional trade association operating in the
smart grid field. See IEEE, https://www.ieee.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/BCG9-D2SP].
138 Interview with Technology Firm Engineer 13, supra note 133, at p. 17, ll.
386–390.
139 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 14, supra note 131, at p. 23, ll. 6–20.

2017]

FIELD OF VISIONS

721

basis of a real business case because they’re not going to get half of it
paid for by the government. And so that has slowed things down.140

Thus, some Washington-based technology companies are adopting
wait-and-see approaches to R&D. This same interviewee said that
his firm would proceed at the “speed of value,”141 meaning that
firms only proceed if the utility companies can show that their
product has “value in a business case.”142
Our interviews with technology company representatives
revealed an even more profound type of uncertainty—one that
goes beyond prices and the “speed of value.” Rather, this
additional uncertainty involves the very parameters that define
the smart meter/AMI market, reinforcing the idea that the field
as a whole is highly unsettled:
[A]nother power of the internet of things is just using that
infrastructure for a whole variety of things. And that’s where it may
not be one utility that is the end user of this internet of things. It
could be a city that is providing a service that people can use. An end
user can be getting value out of this. And that’s a much harder thing
to figure out. From a vendor kind of perspective, who do you market
to in that case?143

In this example, smart cities will eventually be capable
of integrating power generation and distribution, but also
transportation, housing, and commerce in one highly complex
interconnected system or linked systems.144 When the entire
society becomes tightly integrated in this way, who counts as
“the customer” becomes an open question—and one not
easily answered.
Thus firms anticipate the need to design technologies that
will be used by a range of actors providing multiple services.
“[Y]ou may need multiple customers to share an infrastructure
to get the cost/benefit of it out. And it’s much harder, hard
enough to sell things to one customer.”145 Such a highly
uncertain economic environment describes the opposite of a
settled field populated by an established set of actors running
through highly institutionalized scripts.146 The smart meter
140 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 16, supra note 125, at pp. 15–16,
ll. 23–9. ARRA is the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 14, supra note 131, at p. 11, ll.
1–12.
144 Marris, supra note 118.
145 Interview with Technology Firm Manager 14, supra note 131, at p. 11, ll. 1–12.
146 See Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In:
Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232–63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
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field—its configurations, its meanings, and its assumptions—is
anything but taken for granted.
CONCLUSION
These four types of organizational actors—utilities,
researchers, consumer advocates, and technology firms—share
a global technological vision of the smart grid as a key feature
of the IoT, and all recognize the central place of smart meters
within that larger, evolving grid system. All of these actors also
hold a positive view of smart meters and are deeply involved in
their design, development, and implementation.
The differences, however, emerge in how actors
understand the role of smart meters, and where they see the
potential of smart meters for making positive interventions in
electricity generation and distribution in the shift to alternative
energy systems and green technology. While all actors hold
qualitatively “positive” views of smart meters, the field remains
unsettled because meanings, markets, and incentives are highly
dynamic. Concepts remain abstract, and orientations and
perceptions differ among categories of actors. The technology
means something different to each of them: a means of economic
efficiency, a tool for democratization,147 a machine-governed
system, or the risks of interoperability.148 We argue that this
divergence reflects the fact that the field is unsettled, the
positions that actors hold in the field are in flux, and their
relationships with one another are uncertain. Utilities are no
longer monopsony actors, but face potential competition from
prosumers. Regulators, who have traditionally set electricity
prices, may play a less central role if market mechanisms are
integrated into electricity distribution. Researchers see
themselves as becoming “leaders” in the energy transition.
Technology firms are reconsidering what it means to base their
business models on proprietary research and development.
These differences and uncertainties raise questions about
the extent to which the disparate technological visions we
identify in this article cohere enough that actors will be able to
coordinate to fully achieve the potential benefits that
policymakers, technology firm engineers, and academic
researchers hope it will bring. To be sure, we find many potential
synergies that could be exploited to mutual advantage. For
example, technology firms and researchers share an interest in
147
148

See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.D.

2017]

FIELD OF VISIONS

723

developing and identifying markets for new technologies.
Consumer advocates and utilities both seem to share a sense of
responsibility towards consumers. Moreover, researcher
expertise—“thinking outside the box”—can benefit technology
firms, regulators, and utilities who operate under different and
tighter legal and economic constraints.
But while the visions of key actors are, in some ways,
complementary, comments by research participants also identify
areas of potential challenge. Specifically, they demand that we
consider how utilities will adapt to a potentially less centralized
grid and the changes to their traditional profit model. What is
the future of government regulation of prices? How much are
consumers really going to be integrated into the grid as active
participants or “prosumers”? How are technology companies
going to provide meters that meet multiple needs of multiple
actors (water, natural gas, telephone, the Internet, etc.)? For
actors within the field, these and other unresolved issues remain
sources of high uncertainty and potential conflict. For social
scientists, these same issues present untapped opportunities to
study the dynamics of organizational fields in the nation’s
halting transition to a more sustainable energy system.
We believe that future social science and policy research
should embrace four important challenges that have emerged
from the present study. The first challenge is that field-level
analyses should be central to this collective research effort.149
At present, this orientation to theory and method is virtually
absent from the existing literature on smart meters and the
smart grid. Social scientists and legal scholars should not
expect to be able to explain smart meter (and more broadly
smart grid) implementation by focusing only on single factors—
changes in government regulations, or development of new
technological capacities, or market conditions. Instead, future
research should include a forthright focus on the smart meter
field as a whole—exploring not just the visions of different
types of organizational actors, but also their relationships with
each other, and how each type of actor adjusts its strategy in
response to the behaviors of others in the field. Smart meter
implementation depends on the coordinated actions of multiple
organizational
actors;
therefore,
understanding
the
interdependencies among these actors is essential.
A second challenge, implied by the first, is to develop
strategies for conducting research across multiple scales and
149 Jennie C. Stephens et al., Getting Smart? Climate Change and the Electric
Grid, 4 CHALLENGES 201, 203 (2013).
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geographies. Although we focus on Washington State, fieldlevel analyses have the potential to explain variation in smart
meter implementation across state lines, and may also be
useful at smaller scales—such as municipalities. A multi-scalar
and comparative approach to “fields-within-fields” will be
difficult but necessary if our goal is to understand the economic,
political, and sociotechnical dynamics shaping energy transition
efforts in the United States.
The third challenge, which field theory does not directly
anticipate, but which in some ways may be the most important
in achieving policy impact, is to study consumers as they
interact with the smart meter field. Because our study focuses
on organizational actors, we do not report data that might
illuminate how consumers view their relationships with utilities
or how likely they are to change. Nevertheless, fully realizing
the potential of smart meters and visions of a decentralized
smart grid will require analyses that pay systematic attention to
different types of consumers as well as factors affecting different
modes of consumer engagement.
Finally, this study reminds us of the importance of
thinking outside our disciplinary boxes. Like smart meters, the
explanations we render as sociologists or legal scholars are also
multivalent—they will be interpreted differently by different
stakeholders and implemented (or ignored) in ways that suit
decision makers at particular times, places, and settings. To
make a difference, the analytical frameworks that researchers
employ should be broad and pliable rather than narrow and
rigid. We believe field theory has the potential to impact energy
policy because it examines the broader relational dynamics of
actors—including energy policy experts and organizations—
that allow us to identify interorganizational challenges and
improve the fit between policy goals and outcomes.

